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ABSTRACT  
   
In this study, I examine the extent to which firms rely on relative performance 
evaluation (RPE) when setting executive compensation. In particular, I examine whether 
firms use information about peer performance to determine compensation at the end of 
the year, i.e. after both firm and peer performance are observed. I find that RPE is most 
pronounced for firms that allow little or no scope for ex post discretionary adjustments to 
annual bonuses.  Conversely, firms grant mainly discretionary bonuses exhibit little use 
of RPE. These findings suggest that information about peer performance is not used at 
the end of the year.  Instead, peer performance seems to be incorporated in performance 
targets at the beginning of the year, at least among firms primarily using objective 
performance targets. In addition, I provide new evidence on the determinants of the use 
of subjectivity in annual bonus plans. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
      This study examines the use of relative performance evaluation (“RPE”) and the use 
of discretionary bonuses in annual bonus contracts of executives.  The design of 
executive compensation has been the subject of a large stream of literature (Murphy, 
1999; Ittner and Larcker, 2001).  More specifically, there is also extensive empirical and 
theoretical literature examining the extent to which firms rely on RPE when awarding 
incentive compensation (Holmström, 1979; 1982; Albuquerque, 2009).  
      However, the results from this stream of research provide mixed support for the 
theoretical prediction that firms incorporate information about peer performance into 
their evaluations to protect their managers from uncontrollable shocks to their 
environment.  Early empirical studies infer the use of RPE implicitly from a negative 
coefficient on peer performance when regressing executive compensation on both firm 
and peer performance (Antle and Smith, 1986).  Several studies (Gibbons and Murphy, 
1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992) find support for the use of RPE while others (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Garvey and Milbourn, 2003) find no such support. 
      Recent studies take advantage of SEC’s 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules 
which require detailed information on how executive compensation is determined 
including information on the use of relative peer performance and the composition of the 
peer group.  These additional disclosure requirements provide an opportunity to examine 
the explicit use of RPE.  Gong et al. (2011)1 find about 25% of their sample firms make 
at least one component of executive compensation contingent on firm performance 
                                                 
1
 Similarly, Gao et al. (2012) find about 35% of the firms use RPE and Black et al. (2011) show about 18% 
firms use RPE in setting CEO’s compensation. 
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relative to a group of peers.  This low use of RPE is puzzling given the use of RPE allows 
firms to filter out noise from performance evaluations and reduce the compensation risk 
for their managers.   
      In addition to the finding that the use of RPE is relatively low in practice, the 
literature provides little, if any, insight into how RPE is implemented.  Specifically, firms 
can use information on peer performance in at least two ways when determining 
compensation.  First, RPE can be used ex post in that a firm compares its own 
performance against that of a peer group during a period.  This approach requires room 
for discretionary adjustments to incorporate peer performance information which 
becomes available only after the period is over.  Without room for discretionary 
adjustments, objective formulas that determine compensation based on pre-determined 
targets would leave little scope for incorporation of information about current period’s 
peer performance.  Second, RPE can also be implemented ex ante by setting beginning-
of-period performance targets dependent upon prior years’ peer performance.         
      Studies examining the use of RPE do not distinguish between the two types of RPE 
due to data availability constraints.  In this study, I rely on improved disclosures about the 
design of executive annual bonus plans to study the use of RPE and the use of 
discretionary bonuses.  I focus on executive annual bonus plans because the disclosure of 
bonus formulas provides an opportunity to empirically measure the extent to which 
companies rely on discretionary bonuses.  In contrast, prior literature mainly focuses on 
total compensation where it is practically infeasible to measure the extent of subjectivity 
or discretionary compensation awards. 
 
3 
            In this paper, I hand collect data on the proportion of executive annual bonus that 
is to be determined subjectively at the end of a period (which I refer to as discretionary 
bonuses) and examine the extent to which it is related to the use of RPE.  First, I provide 
evidence that firms relying more on discretionary bonuses in annual bonus contracts use 
RPE less frequently.  This finding is inconsistent with the conventional belief that RPE is 
done ex post after information about contemporaneous peer performance becomes 
available.  Conversely, the use of RPE is more pronounced among firms who rely more 
on objective performance measures.  This evidence is consistent with the notion that past 
peer performance is built into performance targets.   
      Second, I use more detailed data than available in prior literature to examine whether 
the reliance on subjectivity and discretionary bonuses is due to optimal contracting or 
management entrenchment.  Based on predictions consistent with optimal contracting, I 
show that the use of discretionary bonuses is positively related to the noisiness of 
financial performance measurements and firms’ growth opportunities.  Additionally, I 
show that the use of discretionary bonuses is higher for financially distressed firm.  On 
the contrary, I do not find support for the management entrenchment prediction that CEO 
power is positively associated with the use of subjectivity.  In particular, CEO tenure, 
ownership, influence over the board, and institutional ownership are not significantly 
associated with the use of discretionary bonuses. 
      My findings contribute to the literature as follows.  First, I provide evidence that the 
use of RPE differs for firms relying more on objective performance measures in 
performance evaluation and frims granting mainly discretionary bonuses.  This offers one 
possible explanation for the mixed findings in prior RPE literature.  Specifically, prior 
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studies do not distinguish between firms with objective performance measures from those 
with subjective performance measures in performance evaluation.  The results from this 
study suggest that tests of RPE may have more power in samples of firms relying 
primarily on objective performance measures.   
      Second, my results suggest that firms incorporate peer performance in target setting. 
Firms relying solely on objective formulas have limited scope to implement RPE at the 
end of a performance period.  At the same time, my results suggest that these are the 
firms where RPE is most pronounced.  Hence, it is likely that these firms incorporate peer 
performance at the beginning of the performance period via target setting.  Theoretically, 
the benefit of basing targets on peer performance is that it helps alleviate the negative 
consequences of target ratcheting arising when targets are based solely on a firm’s own 
past performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).   
      Third, this study replicates and extends some findings of prior studies on the use of 
subjectivity (Ittner et al., 1997; Gibbs et al., 2004; Matějka et al., 2009; Höppe and 
Moers, 2011).  Given data limitation, prior studies use crude indicator variables to 
measure subjectivity.  This study uses a continuous measure reflecting discretionary 
awards as a percentage of total bonuses for a larger sample over multiple years.  I 
replicate prior findings that firms with greater growth opportunities, adopting a 
prospector strategy, or with noisier financial measures rely more on subjectivity when 
determining CEO’s annual bonus.  Moreover, consistent with prior literature, I do not 
find support for the management entrenchment prediction that CEO power is positively 
associated with the use of subjectivity.  
5 
      In the next chapter, I discuss prior theory and empirical evidence on the use of RPE, 
the choice of performance measures, and the use of subjectivity in setting compensation.  
Chapter 3 describes the data collection and sample selection procedure.  The results from 
empirical tests are presented in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 concludes.      
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Chapter 2 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS  
2.1. RPE Literature 
              The informativeness principle predicts that a signal about performance should be 
incorporated in the compensation contract if and only if it reveals information about an 
agent’s effort that is not subsumed by the performance measures already included in the 
contract (Holmström, 1979).  One source of information that is useful when evaluating an 
agent’s performance is the performance of a peer group.  Specifically, peer performance 
reflects the same exogenous shocks as those affecting the agent’s performance and 
consequently can be used to filter out these common shocks or noise facing a group of 
peers (Holmström, 1982).   
      In spite of the appealing theoretical logic, empirical evidence on the use of RPE is 
mixed.  Several empirical studies regress compensation on firm performance and peer 
performance and infer the use of RPE from a negative coefficient on peer performance.      
Using a small sample, Antle and Smith (1986) document that good peer performance as 
measured by accounting and market return reduces compensation.  Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990) find support for the use of RPE but only for market returns as measures of 
performance.  Using larger samples, Garvey and Milbourn (2003, 2006) find some 
support for the use of RPE for young executives and Rajgopal et al. (2006) find support 
for the use of RPE in S&P 500 firms.  In contrast, several studies find little support for 
theoretical prediction of RPE (Barro and Barro, 1990; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).   
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      More recent studies examine the explicit use of RPE relying on SEC’s new disclosure 
requirements2.  Gong et al. (2011) find about 25% of the S&P 1500 firms and Black et al. 
(2011) find 18% of the S&P 500 firms explicitly use peer performance in setting 
compensation in 20063.  In both studies, a firm is defined as a RPE firm if it mentions 
that at least one component of executive compensation is determined based on firm 
performance relative to a group of peers in the compensation disclosure.   
      Given the potential of RPE to filter out uncontrollable shocks to performance, the use 
of explicit RPE documented empirically seems to be relatively low, and the evidence 
based on the implicit approach is relatively weak.  Moreover, in spite of an ample amount 
of research in the area, it is still unclear how exactly firms incorporate information about 
peer performance into compensation contracts.  There are at least two ways for firms to 
do so.  First, firms can incorporate information on peer performance by comparing firm 
performance against that of a peer group at the end of the period (ex post RPE).  Given 
that payout of performance contingent compensation (such as annual bonus) is usually 
determined based upon the attainment of a set of performance targets, firms can only 
incorporate peer performance at the end of the performance period if discretionary ex  
  
                                                 
2
 Securities and Exchange Commission release No.33-8732, Executive Compensation and Related Person 
Disclosure issued on August 11, 2006 with November 7, 2006 as the effective date.  This disclosure rule  
requires firms to provide detailed information on what the compensation elements are and how each 
element of compensation is determined (amount and the formula including weights and nature on each 
performance targets, if applicable).  Additionally, firms are required to disclose the use of RPE and the 
composition of peer groups if applicable.   
3
 Using data from United Kingdom, Carter el al. (2009) find about fifty percent of the performance-vested 
equity grants plan uses some level of explicit RPE.  
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post adjustments are allowed4.  Thus, RPE can enter into compensation contracts at the 
end of a performance evaluation period. 
      Second, firms can use information about prior year’s peer performance to adjust 
targets set at the beginning of the year along with other determinants of performance 
targets (ex ante RPE).  If past performance of peer firms provides additional information 
about the type of environment managers will be facing in the current period, it should be 
incorporated into performance targets.  For example, if past peer performance is 
favorable, it is more likely that managers face a favorable economic environment, and 
firms should revise their targets upward.  Conversely, if past peer performance is 
unfavorable, it is more likely that managers face unfavorable exogenous shocks, and 
therefore, firms should revise their targets downward. 
      Several analytical studies show the benefits of incorporating information about peer 
performance when setting performance targets (Shleifer, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992)5.  In particular, when targets depend more on past peer performance and less on 
past own performance, they are less likely to be affected by the ratchet effect (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992).  The ratchet effect arises when firms use current performance to set 
future goals (Weitzman, 1980).  When targets are set using prior performance, managers 
                                                 
4
 Less commonly, firms can combine ex ante and ex post approach and determine the bonus payout based 
on the pre-determined ranking among itself in relation to other firms in a comparable group.  For example, 
Comerica Inc’s 2009 bonus payout is based on its earnings per share growth in relation to EPS growth in 
pre-determined peer group consisting of 11 companies.  
5 When setting targets, a regulator can base them on own-performance or performance of peers. An example 
is Medicare’s reimbursement scheme to hospitals.  Each patient is assigned to a diagnostically related 
group.  Medicare reimburses hospitals a fixed fee per patient calculated by averaging the costs of all 
patients treated in a particular group over the previous year.  A hospital can keep the difference between the 
costs of treating a patient and the average costs of treating a particular type of patient in the previous 
period.   
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have less incentive to work hard in the current period, as the outcome of the current 
period is likely to increase the performance target in the future period.  Using peer 
performance to set targets provides incentives to work hard and does not suffer from the 
ratchet problem.   
      Empirically, using data from a single firm, Aranda et al. (2010) show that peer 
performance is incorporated in the target setting process and that the use of past peer 
performance alleviates target ratcheting.   Similarly, using survey data, Indjejikian et al. 
(2012) show that peer performance is incorporated when firms revise their performance 
targets.             
      Figure 1 gives a timeline illustrating how different types of RPE reflect different 
timing of peer performance information is incorporate in to performance evaluation.  Ex 
post RPE entails the use of contemporaneous peer performance (Peer Performancet) at 
the end of the period in determining bonuses   Conversely, when a compensation contact 
is determined in part based on past peer performance (Peer Performancet-1) at the 
beginning of a performance period, this is referred to as ex ante RPE.  Compensation 
formulas (performance measurements, weight on each performance measurement, and 
performance targets) are determined at the beginning of a performance period, and it is 
costly for firms to renege on the contracts6.   
      In summary, firms can use ex ante RPE to incorporate prior year’s peer performance 
into targets and then rely on an objective performance formula when evaluating 
                                                 
6
 There are two directions firm can renege on contacts: Upward adjustment and downward adjustment.  
When firms renege contacts through making downward adjustments to bonuses, it reduces the effectiveness 
of the contracts by weakening the incentive for future periods.  On the other hand, firms may choose to 
deviate from compensation formula by making upward adjustments.  This is also costly as this upward 
adjustment can be viewed as evidence for rent extraction.   
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managers’ performance.  Alternatively, firms can use ex post RPE and rely on the use of 
discretionary bonuses to incorporate information on peer performance.   
 
2.2 The Choice of Performance Measure and Discretionary Bonuses 
            Much of the RPE literature implicitly assumes that executive compensation is 
primarily determined by stock returns and accounting returns.  Prior research also 
provides evidence on the use of different performance measures.  Early studies focus on 
the choice between accounting and market returns in setting compensation (Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993). More recent literature focuses on the choice of non-financial 
performance measures.  For example, Ittner et al. (1997) hypothesize and find positive 
relation between noise in financial measures and the use of non-financial measures.  
Bushman et al. (1996) show that the use of individual performance evaluation is positively 
related with the noisiness of objective measures.  Overall, consistent with optimal 
contracting predictions, the findings in this stream of literature suggest that firms put more 
emphasis on measures that are less noisy, more sensitive to managers’ actions and more 
congruent with firms’ goals.   
      Following this stream of research, several studies also examine the use of 
discretionary bonuses or subjectivity in general when awarding incentive compensation.  
When used appropriately in incentive contracting, the use of subjectivity can improve 
managerial incentives (Baker et al., 1994).  Specifically, objective measures, such as 
accounting returns are more likely to be short-term focused, backward looking, and 
subject to manipulations.  Relying solely on the objective measures may motivate a 
narrow focus on the short-term measures and destroy value in the long term (Bol, 2008).  
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Additionally, some dimensions of managerial effort are not easily quantifiable, and 
reliance solely on objective measures would lead to inefficient task allocation (Holmström 
and Milgrom, 1991).  Therefore, the use of subjectivity can induce actions that are more 
congruent with the firms’ goals (Feltham and Xie, 1994). 
      Conversely, there are some costs associated with using subjectivity to determine 
compensation.  For example, the management entrenchment hypothesis predicts that CEO 
power is positively associated with the use of subjectivity as boards use subjectivity to 
increase CEO compensation above the level justifiable by performance evaluated on 
objective measures.  Bebchuk and Fried (2006) argue that the use of discretionary bonuses 
ensures “managers are well paid even with poor performance based on objective criteria”.  
Subjectivity in compensation can be used as a means to justify “excess” pay and to 
provide an illusion that the compensation is linked to performance.   
 
2.3 Hypothesis  
              In this section, I integrate both streams of literature discussed above and state two 
competing hypothesis.  First, discretionary bonuses can be complementary with RPE in 
that they allow firms to incorporate information about peer performance which is only 
available at the end of a performance period.  One common goal shared by the use of 
discretionary bonuses and the use of RPE is that both improve contracting by reducing the 
risk faced by managers.  When companies allow scope for discretionary bonuses in their 
annual bonus contract, they allow information about peer performance to be incorporated 
and consequently reduce exogenous risks faced by managers.  Therefore, if companies 
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primarily care about minimizing compensation risks, RPE and discretionary bonuses 
should be complements and I would expect: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The negative association between executive compensation and 
peer performance is more pronounced in companies that rely on discretionary 
bonuses to a greater extent.  
 
Alternatively, information about peer performance can be built in into beginning-of-the-
period targets.  For example, if all peers performed well in the prior period, the company 
is more likely to adjust the current period’s targets upward.  In addition to eliminating the 
need for discretionary bonuses, this approach also makes targets more efficient in the 
sense that it limits managerial ability to game future targets by reducing the current effort.  
When targets are set based on peer performance, a manager has less incentive to shirk as 
her good performance in the current period has less of an impact on future targets.  
      Therefore, if firms are primarily concerned about minimizing adverse incentive 
effects of targets, I would expect RPE to be built into the performance targets ex ante.  In 
other words, RPE should be more pronounced in companies that use mainly objective 
measures.  Hence, if RPE is built ex ante into the performance targets at the beginning of 
the performance period, I would expect  
 
Hypothesis 1b: The negative association between executive compensation and 
peer performance is less pronounced in companies that rely on discretionary 
bonuses to a greater extent. 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Sample Selection 
      The sample selection begins with firms that have December 31st as their fiscal year-
end.  I retrieve the proxy statements for a randomly selected sample of 500 firms between 
the years 2007 to 2009.  Information about performance measurements and the weight 
assigned to each of these performance measurements in annual bonus contracts are based 
on the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) section. I require sample firms to 
have executive compensation data from Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database, 
financial data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat and monthly stock return data from the 
Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP).   
Similar to Albuquerque (2009), I drop a firm-year from the sample if CEO tenure 
is less than one year, or if the total compensation is less than or equal to zero.  I drop 
additional firm-year if total assets are less than ten million dollars, sales are less than 
zero, or if common equity at year-end is less than zero.         
 
3.2. Variable Measurement 
Firms’ Use of Subjective Performance Measures in Executive Annual Bonus Contracts 
      Höppe and Moers (2011) suggest that the use of discretionary bonuses is one of the 
main ways to incorporate subjectivity into annual bonus plans.  To empirically quantify 
the extent to which companies rely on discretionary bonuses, I collect information for all 
performance measurements mentioned in the annual incentive plan discussion in the 
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CD&A section of each proxy statement.  Appendix A provides representative proxy 
disclosures for the use of different performance measures in cases with varying extents of 
reliance on discretionary bonuses.  I classify performance measures into three categories: 
(i) financial, (ii) non-financial (such as customer satisfaction, diversity, quality, 
innovation, safety and investor relations), and (iii) subjective including discretionary, 
individual, and strategic measures that are likely to be evaluated subjectively. 
      After categorizing all the performance measures, I calculate DiscretionaryBonus for 
each firm-year as the sum of all the weights placed on the measures in category (iii).  
Additionally, I use a broader definition based on the lack of pre-determined performance 
standards.  In this alternative approach, I take all the performance measures classified into 
category (ii) and check if there is a pre-determined threshold, a target or an upper bound 
performance level associated for these non-financial measures.  DiscretionaryBonuses2 is 
then calculated as the sum of weights on measures in category (iii) above as well as 
nonfinancial measures (category ii) without targets. 
            I follow Albuquerque (2009) when defining all measures used in the RPE models.  
Peer return is calculated based on equal-weighted stock return portfolio for peer firms 
that are in the same two-digit SIC code and size quartile group.  I sort all firms with 
assets more than $10 million in the merged CRSP-Compustat with the same two-digit 
SIC (SIC2) into size-quartile grouped by beginning-of-year market value.  Peer return is 
the return of the equal-weight portfolio after excluding the return of the own firm.  When 
the number of firms in a SIC2-Size group is less than two, the SIC2 group is used.  
15 
 
Other Variables 
              In addition to my primary variable of interest, I also include controls for other 
variables related to the use of subjectivity in prior studies.  Ittner et al. (1997) use the ratio 
of research and development to sales (RD/sales) and the ratio of employees to sales 
(EMP/Sales) to capture firm strategy.  Firms with higher RD/sales ratio and firms with 
higher EMP/Sales are assumed to be following a prospector strategy as prospectors 
respond to the environment by maintaining innovations and providing quality goods and 
services, whereas a defender strategy focuses on delivering goods and services efficiently 
(Miles et al., 1978).  In addition to these variables, I also control for firm size (Smith and 
Watts, 1992), growth opportunities (Core and Guay, 1999; Albuquerque, 2009) and four 
different measures of corporate governance: CEO tenure, ownership, influence over the 
board, and institutional ownership.  I  include the noisiness of financial measures as Ittner 
et al. (1997) show the weight placed on financial measures is negatively associated with 
the noisiness of these measures.  Appendix B provides a detailed explanation on how each 
variable is constructed. 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
      Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the empirical tests.  Panel A 
of Table 1 describes the annual bonus compensation in the sample and shows the mean 
(median) level of annual bonus is $813,030 ($540,220).  Firm performance and industry-
size peer performance are measured by stock returns.  The average (median) of firm 
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return is 3.0% (0.4%) and mean (median) industry-size peer return is 2.1% (3.3%).  
Furthermore, the average CEO tenure in my sample is 8.31 years which is comparable to 
8.5 years, the average tenure of CEO in the sample of Albuquerque (2009).  Lastly, the 
average CEO total compensation is $4.31 million and the median CEO total 
compensation is $3.03million.   
3.4. Model Specification 
My hypotheses predict that the extent to which firms rely on subjective evaluation 
is related to their use of RPE.  Thus, I first estimate a model validating my measure of 
subjectivity.  Second, I specify a model of RPE based on prior literature. 
 To validate my measures, I follow Matějka et al. (2011) and estimate a tobit 
regression7 examining the association between my measures of subjectivity and the 
known determinants of the use of subjectivity.   
DiscretionaryBonusit ＝ C0 + α1Firm Sizeit + α2Growthit  
+ α3ROA Noiseit + α4ROE Noiseit + α5ROS Noiseit  
+α6Bankruptcyit + α7Prior Financialit  
+ α8RD Sales Ratioit  + α9Employees Sales Ratioit  
+ α10Institutioanl Ownership Ratioit + α11CEO Tenureit + α12CEO Ownershipit  
+ α13CEO Chairman Dualityit + εit.                                                                                                    (1) 
            To estimate a model of RPE, I rely on the same specification as in Albuquerque 
(2009).  In both equations below, the subscript it indicates a firm-year pair where the 
subscript t indicates time in year and the subscript i indicates a firm.     
                                                 
7 A tobit model is estimated because the dependent variable ranges between 0 to 100 
with probability mass at both corner values (Wooldridge, 2002).  
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CEOPayit＝ C0 + α1FirmPerfit + α2PeerPerfit +α3ControlVariablesit+εit.                       (2)       
In addition, I include an interaction term to examine the relation between the use of RPE 
and the use of subjectivity in annual bonus contracts. 
CEOPayit＝ C0 + α1FirmPerfit + α2PeerPerfit + α3 DiscretionaryBonusit       
                              
+ α4 DiscretionaryBonus it×PeerPerfit + α5ControlVariablesit + εit.             (3) 
 
Equation (2) is the model specified in Albuquerque (2009) and Equation (3) is an 
extension of Equation (2) incorporating the use of discretionary bonuses 
(DiscretionaryBonus).   
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Chapter 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Use of the Discretionary Bonuses  
      Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (1).  The dependent variable in 
Panel A of Table 2 is DiscretionaryBonus, the proportion of bonus based on measures that 
likely require subjective evaluation.  I find that the use of discretionary bonuses is 
positively associated with growth opportunities, noise in financial measures, financial 
distress, and firm’s strategy as reflected in EMP/Sales.  The results are largely similar 
when using DiscretionaryBonus2 as an alternative measure. 
      These findings replicate the results of prior studies (Ittner et al., 1997; Höppe and 
Moers, 2011) and extend them by using a continuous measure of discretionary bonuses 
rather than an indicator variable.  The evidence supports the prediction of contracting 
theory that firms use incentive weights proportional to their signal-to-noise ratios (Banker 
and Datar, 1989).  I find firms rely on subjective evaluations (via discretionary bonuses) 
to a greater extent when financial measures are less informative.  Additionally, relying 
solely on objective measures may not be appropriate for distressed firms and firms with 
greater growth opportunities because some of the  performance dimensions are either 
difficult to quantify or long-term in nature; therefore, these firms choose to rely more on 
discretionary bonuses to induce efforts in areas that are more aligned with maximizing 
firm value.  
19 
      As in prior studies (Ittner et al., 1997; Höppe and Moers, 2011), I do not find support 
for the relation between CEO power and the use of discretionary bonuses predicted by the 
management entrenchment hypothesis. 
      Finally, I find distressed firms are more likely to rely on subjective measures in 
determining bonuses.  Ittner et al. (1997) hypothesize that financially distressed firms 
place greater weights on financial measures and find no support for their predicted 
relation.  Matějka et al. (2011) show distressed firms are less likely to use nonfinancial 
performance measures in annual bonus plan.  The discrepancy between my findings and 
those in prior studies may be due to the sample period under study (2007 – 2009) when 
the recessionary environment made objective measures with predetermined targets noisier 
particularly for financially distressed companies.   
4.2. Relative Performance Evaluation 
      Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (2).  Column 1 and column 2 
replicate the results of Albuquerque (2009) while column 3 and column 4 present the 
results of extending the sample period through 2009.  I find that the coefficient on firm 
performance is positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient on peer 
performance is negative and significant (both p<0.01) for both sample periods. 
      Table 5 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) using 2007 - 2009 for which 
data on subjectivity are available and all other sample selection criteria are met (n=1,088).  
Panel A presents the results using annual cash bonus as the dependent variable.  The 
results are as expected in that firm performance is positive and statistically significant, and 
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the coefficient on peer performance is negative and significant (both p<0.01).  Panel B 
presents the results of estimating Equation (2) using total compensation as the dependent 
variable.  In contrast to Table 4, the coefficient on firm performance is not statistically 
significant while the coefficient on peer performance remains negative and significant 
(p=0.01).  However, total compensation is not the main focus of this study because it is 
practically infeasible to measure the use of discretionary bonuses in equity compensation.  
Instead, the main RPE model relates to how bonuses respond to peer performance and 
Panel A shows the results are as expected.   
      For the main test, I estimate Equation (3) which also includes the interaction term, 
allowing the effect of peer performance to be moderated by the use of discretionary 
bonuses.  Table	6 presents the results of estimating Equation (3) using a sample from 2007 
to 2009.  The main results are in Panel A where the dependent variable is annual cash 
bonus.  Consistent with the standard RPE prediction, firm performance is significantly 
positive and peer performance is negatively associated with annual bonuses (both p<0.01).  
More importantly, the association between the use of RPE and the use of subjectivity 
(Peer return and DiscretionaryBonus) is significantly positive (p=0.022) which is 
consistent with H1b.  In other words, the negative association between peer performance 
and the annual bonus payout is dampened by the use of discretionary bonuses.  This 
suggests that firms relying more on objective performance measures are more likely to 
incorporate peer performance when evaluating CEO performance.    
     For completeness, I estimate Equation (3) using total compensation as the dependent 
variable with results presented in Panel B.  I find that firm performance is not significantly 
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associated with the total compensation and peer performance is significantly negative 
(p=0.01).  As discussed before, this could be due to the difficulty of measuring the use of 
discretionary bonuses in total compensation or due to the sample period analyzed. 
      In summary, I replicate the prior RPE result that peer performance is negatively 
associated with compensation.  I extend this well-established finding by incorporating the 
use of subjectivity in performance evaluation.  I find that firms relying more on objective 
performance measures are more likely to incorporate past peer performance in setting 
compensation.  In other words, firms relying more on objective performance measures set 
performance targets utilizing past peer performance.  This result is consistent with 
theoretical arguments that firms use past peer performance when setting targets to 
alleviate adverse incentive effects of target ratcheting.   
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
      This study empirically examines the use of RPE and the use of discretionary bonuses 
in executive bonus contracts.  Specifically, I find a stronger association between the use 
of RPE and that of objective performance measures utilizing information disclosed in 
proxy statements from 2007 to 2009.  The result suggests the extent to which firms rely 
on subjective evaluations should also be considered when examining the use of RPE.   
      This paper contributes to the RPE literature by providing a possible explanation for 
the mixed empirical results on the use of RPE.  The results of this study suggest the 
decision about RPE is not independent of other incentive design decisions.  The RPE 
decision is one of the dimensions considered in setting compensation along with other 
elements, such as the choice of performance measures and the choice of performance 
targets.  Hence, the use of RPE should not be examined in isolation and the results may 
be stronger if other incentive choices are taken into consideration.   
      Additionally, this study adds to the literature on target setting.  It provides evidence 
that both firm performance and peer performance are used in the target setting process.  
Instead of using subjectivity at the end of a period to incorporate peer performance, firms 
can use past peer performance in the target setting process.  Incorporating peer 
performance into targets minimizes the extent of subjective or discretionary 
compensation adjustments that firms need to make at the end of period to take into 
account peer performance.   
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      This paper also contributes to the literature on the use of discretionary bonuses by 
providing detailed large-sample empirical evidence on the use of discretionary bonuses in 
annual bonus contracts.  Due to data limitations, prior studies in this area can only 
measure discretionary bonuses in performance evaluation as an indicator variable.  I 
collect data on all performance measures in annual bonus contracts and corresponding 
incentive weights placed on each measure.  Relying on this more detailed data, I show 
that the reliance on discretionary bonuses is higher when a firm faces greater growth 
opportunities and when its financial measures are noisy.  Additionally, I find that 
financially distressed firms are more likely to use discretionary bonuses when 
determining their CEO’s annual bonus.   This may suggest that future research can 
examine the relation between the use of discretionary bonuses and the degree of a firm’s 
financial distress.  
      This study has several limitations.  First, I focus on only one component of total 
compensation because it is difficult to measure the use of discretionary bonuses for other 
compensation components.  Second, my sample period overlaps with a global recession 
which may partly confound my findings.  Future research can examine whether my 
findings regarding the relation between the use of discretionary bonuses and RPE extend 
to other periods. 
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APPENDIX A  
CODING CRITERIA AND EXAMPLES OF PROXY DISCLOSURES 
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Below are excerpts from the CD&A reports in the proxy statements filed for the fiscal 
year of 2009.   The first company places 100% of annual bonus for its CEO based on 
objective and financial measures.  The second company places some weight on non-
financial measures with objective targets.  The third and the fourth company place some 
weight on objective measures and some weights on subjective measures.  The fifth 
company does not have formula-based annual bonus compensation.  Information about 
the nature and the weight of performance measures are in bold. 
 
I. Example of DiscretionaryBonus = 0% and DiscretionaryBonus2 = 0% 
 Annual Cash Incentive Awards 
The corporate financial goal for 2009, which was a fully diluted EPS target described 
in detail below, represented 100% of the total award for the Corporate Leadership Council 
members and 60% of the total award for presidents of principal operating subsidiaries, 
including the President of PPL Electric Utilities Corporation. 
 
Annual Cash Incentive Weightings Applied to Financial and Operational Results  
  
              
      CEO;    PPL Electric 
      COO; CFO;   Utilities 
Category     SVP(1)     President  
Financial Results     100%     60%  
Operational Results              
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation     —     20%  
Individual Performance     —     20%  
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II. Example of DiscretionaryBonus = 0% and DiscretionaryBonus2 = 0%  
  Under the 2009 annual incentive compensation design, 80% weighting was given to 
generating free cash flow, which is defined as cash from operations less capital 
expenditures, and 20% weighting was given to nonfinancial factors. Of the 20% 
weighting for nonfinancial factors, 10% was applied to safety—reducing the total 
recordable incident rate and 10% was applied to diversity—increasing the representation 
of women and U.S. minorities in professional and managerial positions. There was an 
opportunity to earn an additional 5% if free cash flow was positive in any quarter. The 
corporate plan target for free cash flow was ($1,283) million and the result was $322 
million, earning a 160% payout. The result for free cash flow was calculated on an after-
tax basis and currency rates and the price of aluminum, which is traded as a commodity 
on the London Metal Exchange (LME), were kept constant at the LME price and 
currency assumptions used when the target was established. In addition, the actual result 
for free cash flow was reduced by the amount of capital expenditures that were deferred 
in 2009, amounting to $158 million. Free cash flow was positive in the fourth quarter, 
which resulted in an additional 5% payout under the plan design. The safety goal of a 
1.360 total recordable incident rate was exceeded by achieving a lower total recordable 
incident rate of 1.277, resulting in a 14.2% payout, however the Compensation and 
Benefits Committee reduced the payout for this factor to 7.1% due to the existence of 
fatalities during the year. The diversity targets ranged from 13.9% to 23.3% 
representation of women and U.S. minorities in various job grades and the results ranged 
from 13.3% to 22.8%, resulting in a payout of 6.8%, as compared with a target for 
diversity of 10%. The total calculated amount for the corporate annual incentive 
compensation plan was 178.8%.  
 
 
III. Example of DiscretionaryBonus = 20% and DiscretionaryBonus2 = 20%  
 
  
Starting in 2006, the MIP consists of two measurements:  the Company Balanced 
Business Performance weighted 80%; and Individual Performance, at the discretion of 
the Board, weighted 20% for each of the officers.  The MIP performance measures are 
described below. 
  
Company Balanced Business Performance.  Includes a set of corporate performance 
measures that appropriately balances performance and risks across the following four 
categories: 
  
 customer (progress toward meeting and exceeding our customer service and reliability 
standards as set by the Vermont Public Service Board; our customers' level of satisfaction 
relative to all other electric utilities in the East Region as measured annually by J.D. 
Power & Associates; and Vermont leaders' opinions of the Company on key issues as 
measured in even numbered years by David Schaefer & Associates or by large 
commercial and industrial customers' satisfaction as measured by Metrix Matrix in odd 
numbered years);  
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 financial (earnings and reducing gap between earned return on equity (ROE) and 
allowed ROE);  
 process improvement (a measure of key process improvement initiatives appropriate 
for the year); and  
 employee measures (key questions from our employee survey and safety measures). 
  
Individual Performance.  Based on the advice and recommendation of the CEO for 
officers reporting to him, the Committee and the Board evaluate individual officer 
performance compared to performance objectives set early in the year, and also evaluate 
the performance of the CEO versus his performance objectives.  Key performance 
objectives from the Company's Strategic Plan and of each officer's teams are incorporated 
into the officer's performance objectives.  These objectives are organized to cover the 
following areas: accountability, empowerment, strategy, personal leadership, and 
teamwork.  Specific sub-objectives and weightings for each of the objectives are set for 
each officer at the beginning of the year.  The rating for each officer's individual 
performance is at the full discretion of the Board. 
 
 
IV. Example of DiscretionaryBonus = 20% and DiscretionaryBonus2 = 25%  
  Objective  Weighting 
50% 
Payout 
Level  
100% 
Payout 
Level  
200% 
Payout 
Level  
Actual 
Performance 
Result  
Payout 
Percentage   
  
  Earnings per share  40%  $1.00  $1.17  $1.40  $1.14  36.5%   
  
  System Average 
Interruption Duration 
Index 
 
5%  
94.45 
minutes  
87.7 
minutes  
80.97 
minutes  
65.05 
minutes  10.0%  
 
  
  % equivalent 
availability—coal and 
nuclear 
 
10%  77.7%  80.7%  81.7%  79.8%  8.5%  
 
  
  OSHA incident rate  10%  4.2  3.7  3.2  2.9  20.0%   
  
  J.D. Power Customer 
Satisfaction Index—
residential 
 
5%  
Bottom 
Half of 
Tier II  
Top Half 
of Tier II  Tier 1  Tier 1  10.0%  
 
  
  Cumulative Synergy 
Savings (due to GMO 
acquisition) 
 
5%  $149.0M  $186.2M  $223.4M  $212.4M  8.5%  
 
  
  Comprehensive 
Energy Plan Progress 
 
5%  
Qualitative measure; judgment 
made on collective work progress  125%  6.3%  
 
  
  
       
 
 
  
  Individual 
performance 
 
20%  Qualitative measure        
 
  
 
V. Example of DiscretionaryBonus= 100% and DiscretionaryBonus2 = 100% 
  
We pay an annual cash bonus in order to link a significant portion of the executive’s 
Total Cash Compensation to specific annual Company results and to reflect individual 
contributions to Company performance. We do not establish a target performance 
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formula for any of our executives, including the Named Executive Officers. Although 
specific business objectives (focusing on safety, service, and financial performance) are 
communicated to the Company as a whole based on the operating plan developed by 
management and presented to the Board, these business objectives do not exclusively 
drive executive bonuses. Instead, the Committee uses these business objectives to 
determine a funding level without using any formulas or assigning specific weight to any 
one objective. The funding level is a percentage of competitive compensation (i.e., 
generally the median to the seventy-fifth percentile of Total Cash Compensation less 
current salaries) depending upon our success in achieving our business objectives and 
other qualitative factors the Committee considers in awarding annual cash bonuses. Then 
the individual bonus awards for each Named Executive Officer are determined on a 
discretionary basis. The Committee believes this is an effective way to reinforce our 
pay-for-performance philosophy, as annual bonuses are based upon (i) in large part, the 
Company’s performance, and (ii) the review by the CEO and/or the Committee of the 
individual executive’s performance during the period. This discretionary process results 
in the annual cash bonus being highly variable, ranging in recent years from zero for all 
Named Executive Officers to an amount that may significantly exceed the executive’s 
base salary. 
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APPENDIX B 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
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Annual Cash Bonus: The logarithm of the real bonus compensation disclosed in the 
proxy statement (using constant 1992 dollar).   
Bankruptcy: A dummy variable takes value of one if the Altman Z-score is less than 
three.   
CEO tenure: The natural logarithm of CEO tenure.  It is calculated as the difference 
between the year and month in which the CEO assumed office and the year and month of 
the end of the current fiscal year.   
DiscretionaryBonuses: Total weights placed on performance measures defined to be 
subjective.  A measure is defined to be subjective if a performance measure is stated to be 
subjective, discretionary, and individual (without mentioning any specific performance 
criteria).  The minimum value this variable can have is 0 and the maximum value this 
variable can have is 100. 
DiscretionaryBonuses2: Total weights on non-financial measures with no pre-determined 
targets (threshold level, target level and upper limit level) associated with the 
performance measures for each firm-year.  The minimum value this variable can have is 
0 and the maximum value this variable can have is 100. 
Duality: A dummy equals to one if the CEO is also the board chair and zero otherwise. 
EMP / Sales: The ratio between number of employees and sales in percentage.  
Firm return: Measured as continuously compounded gross real rate of return to 
shareholders assuming dividends are reinvested.   
Firm Size (sales): Measured as the natural logarithm of sales using constant 1992 dollars.  
The beginning of year values is sued for firm size (and for Growth).     
Growth:  The beginning-of-the-year ratio of market value of the firm to the book value of 
assets.  Market value of the equity is calculated as number of Common Shares 
Outstanding (CSHO) multiplied by the close price of the fiscal year (prcc_f).  The market 
value of the firm is calculated by the value of total assets (AT) minus total book common 
equity (CEQ) plus the market value of the equity (CSHO × prcc_f).   
Institutional Ownership Ratio: Measured as the ratio between Institutional Common 
Stock Holdings and total Shares outstanding.   
Neglag1: A dummy variable takes the value of one if Net Income of prior year is negative 
and zero otherwise. 
Neglag2: A dummy variable takes the value of one if Net Income two years prior to 
current fiscal year is negative and zero otherwise.   
Ownership: A dummy variable takes the value of one is the CEO share ownership is 
greater than the median for the year across CEOs in Execucomp and zero otherwise.  
CEO share ownership is calculated as the number of shares owned by CEO (Shares 
Owned - Options Excluded) divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the 
end of the fiscal year (CSHO).   
Peer return: It is calculated based on equal-weighted stock return portfolio if the peer 
firms in the same two-digit SIC code and size quartile, excluding the own-firm return.   
Relative Variance: Measured as the difference between the variance firm-specific stock 
return and that of the industry over prior 36 months.  
RD / Sales: The ratio between research and development expense of employees and sales.   
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Regulation Dummy: Regulated industry dummy takes value of one for firms in the gas, 
electric and telecommunication industries with SIC codes from 4810 to 4820 or 4900 to 
4939 and zero otherwise.   
ROAnoise: Measured as the standard deviation of median annual return on assets for 
companies in the firm’s 3-digit SIC classification over prior five years.      
ROEnoise: Measured as the standard deviation of median annual return on equity for 
companies in the firm’s 3-digit SIC classification over prior five years.      
ROSnoise: Measured as the standard deviation of median annual return on sales for 
companies in the firm’s 3-digit SIC classification over prior five years.   
Total compensation: The logarithm of the real total annual compensation (using constant 
1992 dollar).  Total annual compensation is calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, other 
annual compensation, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other 
compensation and value of option grants (TDC1). 
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Table 1 
      Sample summary Statics 
   
  N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Panel A. Compensation Data 
     Total compensation 1,088 4318.00 4423.75 1539.31 3030.80 5615.84 
(in thousands) 
Ln of total compensation 1,088 7.96 0.95 7.34 8.02 8.63 
Annual cash bonus  1,088 813.03 1291.33 124.43 540.22 1094.33 
(in thousands) 
Ln of annual cash bonus 1,088 5.13 2.79 4.83 6.29 7.00 
Panel B. Performance measures 
    Firm return  1,088 0.03 0.38 -0.19 0.00 0.18 
Peer return (industry-size) 1,088 0.02 0.24 -0.18 0.03 0.18 
DiscretionaryBonus (%) 1,088 13.45 24.90 0.00 0.00 20.00 
DiscretionaryBonus2 (%) 1,088 17.53 27.86 0.00 0.00 30.00 
Panel C. Firm and CEO characteristics 
    Bankruptcy 1,088 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
EMP / Sales  1,088 0.38 0.77 0.16 0.29 0.42 
Firm size (sales) 1,088 65.78 138.88 9.04 23.11 65.90 
Growth 1,088 1.57 0.78 1.09 1.32 1.79 
Institutional Ownership 
Ratio 1,088 0.77 0.17 0.67 0.79 0.89 
RD / Sales  1,088 0.05 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Regulation Dummy  1,088 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Relative Variance 1,088 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
ROAnoise  1,088 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
ROEnoise 1,088 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.03 
ROSnoise 1,088 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 
CEO tenure  1,088 8.31 7.87 3.11 5.25 10.14 
ln CEO tenure 1,088 1.72 0.87 1.10 1.72 2.29 
Duality 1,088 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ownership 1,088 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Statistics for 1,088 CEO-firm observations for 394 (451) firms (CEO) for the fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
The primary data sets are the performance measures collected proxy statements of each company and 
ExecuComp released by Standard and Poor’s.   
Financial data are obtained from Compustat, stock return data are obtained from the CRSP monthly stock files, 
and the inflation data are obtained from the website of Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis.  All dollar values are 
in thousands (compensation) or millions (firm characteristics). All variables are defined in Appendix B.   
 
  
  
 
    
 
Table 2 
 Correlation Matrix between Firm and CEO Characteristics 
 
Bankrup tcy EMP /  Sales  Firm size (sales ) Growth
Ins t itut ional 
Ownership  Rat io RD /  Sales  Regulation Relative Variance ROAno ise ROEno ise ROSno ise CEO tenure Duality Ownership
Bankrup tcy 1
EMP /  Sales  -0 .1237* 1
Firm s ize (sales ) 0 .0786*  -0 .0751* 1
Growth -0 .4594* 0 .0716* -0 .0479 1
Ins titutional 
Ownership  Rat io -0 .1261*  0 .1006*  -0 .1652* 0 .0431 1
RD /  Sales  0 .0072 0 .0742* -0 .0254 0 .2959* 0 .0383 1
Regulat ion 0 .2874* -0 .1268* -0 .0053  -0 .1674*  -0 .2731* -0 .0343 1
Relative Variance -0 .1413* -0 .0067 0.045 0 .0519 0 .0326 -0 .01  -0 .2041* 1
ROAno ise -0 .1864* 0.044 0 .0101  0 .2443*  0 .0974*  0 .1300* -0 .3216*  0 .2433* 1
ROEno ise 0 .0373 0 .0051 -0 .0005 -0 .0215 0 .0336 0 .0047 -0 .0576 0 .0043 0 .1367* 1
ROSno ise -0 .1010* -0 .0208 0 .0149  0 .2675* 0 .0128   0 .2490* -0 .1266*  0 .3340* 0 .6352* 0 .0366 1
CEO tenure -0 .0660* 0 .0212 -0 .0337  0 .1193* -0 .0029 0 .0038 -0 .0992* -0 .0055 0 .0104 -0 .0262 0 .0011 1
Duality 0 .056 -0 .037 0 .0833*  0 .1412*  0 .0082 -0 .0466 0.02  -0 .2158* -0 .0639* 0 .0072 -0 .0292  0 .1589* 1
Ownership -0 .0997* 0 .1647* -0 .2092 -0 .0005   0 .0624*  0 .0518 -0 .217  -0 .0806*  0 .0234 0 .019 -0 .0566 0 .3896* 0 .0354 1
This tab le p resents  Pearson p roduct-moment correlations  between firm and  CEO characterist ics  in Panel C.  The samp le consis ts  o f 1,088  observat ions covering  the period  from 2007 to  2009 .  
Variab les  are defined  in Append ix B.
* ind icates  s ignificance at  the 5%level.
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Table 3     
Tobit Models on the use of Discretionary Bonuses 
 
Panel A Panel B 
     
  DiscretionaryBonus DiscretionaryBonus2 
  
        
  coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
  
        
Intercept -48.97 0.08 -22.10 0.16 
Firm size (sales) -0.03 0.26 -3.71 0.55 
Growth 10.10 0.04 9.42 0.00 
Regulation Dummy  -13.53 0.23 15.63 0.46 
Bankruptcy 20.93 0.01 48.12 0.00 
RD / Sales  -5.19 0.30 26.72 0.33 
EMP / Sales  -30.27 0.08 -32.21 0.03 
Neglag1 -1.26 0.85 7.87 0.45 
Neglag2 1.63 0.85 19.16 0.64 
ROAnoise  -376.20 0.35 -36.36 0.95 
ROSnoise 138.30 0.02 173.13 0.04 
ROEnoise 13.41 0.00 -3.28 0.65 
Institutional Ownership Ratio 13.36 0.56 10.11 0.77 
CEO tenure  2.50 0.55 6.07 0.30 
Duality -2.63 0.73 -20.76 0.08 
Ownership -0.16 0.98 -3.14 0.77 
Year Dummies  Yes  
 
Yes  
 Firm fixed effect Yes  
 
Yes  
 Sample size  1,088 
 
1,088 
 Pseudo R2  1.24%   1.70%   
This table estimates the equation DiscretionaryBonusit ＝ C0 + α1Firm Sizeit + α2Growthit + α3ROA Noiseit + 
α4ROE Noiseit + α5ROS Noiseit + α6Bankruptcyit + α7Prior Financialit + α8RD Sales Ratioit  + α9Employees Sales 
Ratioit + α10Institutioanl Ownership Ratioit + α11CEO Tenureit + α12CEO Ownershipit + α13CEO Chairman Dualityit 
+ εit.     
Panel A presents the result from regressing the DiscretionaryBonus on its determinants. 
Panel B presents the result from regressing the DiscretionaryBonus2 on its determinants. 
All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Bold coefficients are significant at least at the 10% significance level. 
The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent using the Huber-White correction and  
are clustered by firm. 
 
38 
 
Table 4 
Regressions Estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE using stock returns performance 
measures 
Total Compensation Total Compensation 
1992 - 2005 1992 - 2009 
(level regression) (level regression) 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 5.36 0.00 6.56 0.00 
Firm return  0.23 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Peer return   -0.13 0.00 -0.11 0.00 
Firm size (sales) 0.23 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Growth 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.00 
CEO tenure  0.18 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Regulation 1.94 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Relative Variance 0.37 0.06 0.09 0.00 
Duality 0.01 0.95 - - 
Number of meetings  0.00 0.88 - - 
Ownership 0.01 0.80 0.06 0.00 
Interlock 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.44 
CEO-fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  
Sample size  16,087 22,804 
R2  78.09%   72.74%   
This table estimates the equation CEOPayit＝ C0 + α1FirmPerfit + α2PeerPerfit + α3ControlVariablesit+εit.                   
Column 3 and 4 presents the result from using the natural log of total annual compensation as the dependent 
variable. 
All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Bold coefficients are significant at least at the 10% significance level. 
The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent using the Huber-White correction and are clustered by firm. 
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Table 5 
Regressions Estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE using stock returns 
performance measures 
Panel A Panel B 
Annual Cash Bonus Total Compensation  
2007 - 2009 2007 - 2009 
(level regression) (level regression) 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 4.91 0.00 7.81 0.00 
Firm return  1.95 0.00 0.04 0.52 
Peer return   -2.75 0.00 -0.33 0.01 
Firm size (sales) -0.87 0.06 0.51 0.00 
Growth 0.42 0.12 -0.01 0.91 
CEO tenure  0.46 0.46 -0.08 0.53 
Relative Variance 4.58 0.29 0.67 0.53 
Duality -0.30 0.36 0.08 0.22 
Ownership 1.07 0.01 -0.03 0.69 
CEO-fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies No No 
Sample size  1,088 1,088 
R2  43.02%   78.72%   
This table estimates the equation CEOPayit＝C0+α1FirmPerfit+α2PeerPerfit+α3ControlVariablesit+εit .                  
The dependent variable in Panel A is the natural log of annual cash bonus and the dependent variable 
in Panel B is the natural log of total annual compensation. 
All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Bold coefficients are significant at least at the 10% significance level. 
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Table 6 
Regressions Estimating the sensitivity of CEO  compensation to RPE using stock returns 
performance measures and the use of Discretionary Bonuses  
Panel A Panel B 
Annual Cash Bonus  
2007 - 2009 
Total Compensation 
2007 - 2009 
(level regression) (level regression) 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 4.63 0.00  7.76 0.00 
Firm return  1.92 0.00  0.03 0.62 
Peer return   -3.14 0.00  -0.31 0.02 
DiscretionaryBonus  0.01 0.12  0.01 0.08 
Peer return x DiscretionaryBonus 0.03 0.02  -0.00 0.51 
Firm size (sales) -0.92 0.04  0.51 0.00 
Growth 0.46 0.09  -0.01 0.89 
CEO tenure  0.57 0.35  -0.06 0.61 
Relative Variance 4.58 0.29 0.66 0.44 
Duality -0.36 -0.26 0.08 0.22 
Ownership 1.01 0.02 -0.03 0.69 
CEO-fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies No No 
Sample size  1,088 1,088 
R2  43.53%   78.77%   
This table estimates the equation CEOPayit＝ C0 + α1FirmPerfit + α2PeerPerfit + α3DiscretionaryBonusit 
+α4DiscretionaryBonusit×PeerPerfit+α5ControlVariablesit+εit .                   
The dependent variable in Panel A is the natural log of annual cash bonus and the dependent variable in Panel 
B is the natural log of total annual compensation. 
All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Bold coefficients are significant at least at the 10% significance level. 
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Figure 1 
How Information on Peer Performance is Incorporated in Performance Evaluation 
 
Ex Ante RPE Ex Post RPE 
